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Scott Loren 
“Doubles, Others, and the Split-Self: a Lacanian reading of identity in Paul Auster’s 
New York Trilogy”1 
 
 
First published as a whole in 1987, Paul Auster's The New York Trilogy has often been 
referred to as a postmodern work of detective fiction. Comprised of three stories highly 
similar in structure and theme, the narrator of The Locked Room informs us: "These three 
stories are finally the same story, but each one represents a different stage in my 
awareness of what it is about" (294). The plots of the three stories are constructed around 
a protagonist who finds himself confronted by a certain task. Most poignant, perhaps, is 
that engagement in the task is coupled with a destabilization of the individual's sense of 
self. The more he engages this task, the more he is confounded by it and the more his 
surroundings take on an oddly conspiratorial appearance. We continually witness the 
individual in 'Lacanian moments', where he must address questions of his own 
subjectivity, must take on symbolic mandates, or is confronted by doubles in uncannily 
familiar mirror spaces, where an other individual effectively equals himself, or where 
specters from his past come back to haunt him.  
After various articles and at least one entire monograph on reading Auster's work 
through the lens of Lacanian psychoanalysis (Bernd Herzogenrath's An Art of Desire), 
why return to Auster's The New York Trilogy with Lacan? What presents itself rather 
readily to a Lacanian reading is, on the one hand, the focus on language per se in the 
trilogy. As Heiko Jakubzik suggests, "Auster's focus on language and his play on a coil of 
beings who are either in search of their creators or who have lost contact to them, are the 
main reasons that Auster is so often associated with Lacan. The readable symbols in City 
of Glass undoubtedly find their counterpart in Lacan's symbolic order and the postulate 
that all is language or symbol" (179).2 On the other hand, there is a continual and explicit 
                                                
1 Paper presented at the Hellenic Association for American Studies conference, 2007.
2 "Die Thematisierung der Sprache und Austers Spielereien mit einer Spirale von Geschöpfen, die nach 
ihren Schöpfern suchen oder den Kontakt zu ihnen verloren haben, sind die Hauptgründe dafür, daß Auster 
so oft mit Lacan in Verbindung gebracht wird. Die lesbaren Symbole in der City of Glass haben zweifellos 
ihr Pendant in Lacans symbolischer Ordnung und seinem Postulat, daß alles Sprache oder Symbol sei." My 
translation. 
focus on the nature of the spectral in relation to identity. Quoting Lacan, Paul Jahshan 
points out that "Lacan ends by saying that breaking out of the mirror stage 'generates the 
inexhaustible quadrature of the ego's verifications,' a process diametrically opposed to 
what happens to Blue" in Ghosts (391).3 Jahshan provides a Lacanian reading of Ghosts 
focusing primarily on the attention to language in the "history and theory of writing, from 
its classical times to the present poststructuralist day" (392) that is allegorized in the 
story, and on the visual, or specular, elements within this installment of the trilogy. Like 
Jakubzik and Jahshan, Bernd Herzogenrath and Martin Klepper have also offered 
enlightening Lacanian readings of The New York Trilogy, giving specific attention to the 
aspects of identification through mirroring (Lacan's "mirror stage"), and the symbolic 
register as a linguistic dimension, seeming allusions to which can be found throughout 
these three stories.  
However, despite The New York Trilogy's portrayal of an individual performing a 
balancing act between social ties and a collapse into isolation, and despite Lacan's overall 
concern with subjectivity in its necessarily social context, there is something Lacanian 
readings have surprisingly failed to do: make the connection between Lacan's register of 
the imaginary and the register of the symbolic specifically in their social dimensions as 
these might be relevant to the trilogy. Regarding the individual in its social context, what 
has been favored almost exclusively is the role of the double. 
Though we have increasing become accustomed to considering such fictional 
portrayals of the double in relation to Freud's notion of the uncanny, they also recall 
Lacan's concept of the "imaginary," central to his theory of subjectivity.  In framing the 
destabilization of character identities through various doublings and phantasmatic 
projections, Auster establishes a conceptual basis for commentary on the split nature of 
the subject. Concomitantly directing the reader's focus toward questions of ontology and 
semiology, the book has recourse to various allegories that invoke metaphors for the 
representative nature of language and knowledge, such as Humpty Dumpty's commentary 
on the nature of words, the biblical myth of the Garden and the Fall, and Freud's Fort/Da 
game from "Beyond the Pleasure Principle."  
                                                
3 Quoting Lacan's Écrits. 
A Lacanian theory of subjectivity claims that the subject is inextricably rooted in 
language. Three elements central to this theory are the register of the symbolic, which we 
will discuss in relation to City of Glass, the register of the imaginary, we'll consider in 
Ghosts, and the relation between the big Other and the subject, which we'll find in The 
Locked Room. This kind of mapping (Lacan onto Auster) will provide insight into The 
New York Trilogy's commentary on subjectivity, which I would wager is what makes 
these three stories "the same story." Though I would also wager that following the 
trajectory of these three stories along this specific path will yield a clear development in 
their commentary on subjectivity. For if we are to consider this work a work of detective 
fiction, the mystery each tale seeks to uncover is the mystery of the self in its social 
context. 
 
Language and the Symbolic in City of Glass 
"Language is not truth, it is the way we exist in the world" 
from The Invention of Solitude 
 
In order to facilitate an understanding of Lacanian subjectivity, we might first consider 
the subject's relation to the big Other as being determined through language.  This 
structure is briefly outlined in Lacan's lectures on the "Introduction of the big Other:"4 
 
So there’s the plane of the mirror, the symmetrical world of the egos and of the homogeneous 
others. We’ll have to distinguish an other level, which we call the wall of language… [W]e in 
fact address A1, A2, those we do not know, true Others, true subjects.  They are on the other 
side of the wall of language, there where in principal I never reach them. Fundamentally, it is 
them I am aiming at every time I utter true speech, but I always attain a’, a”, through 
reflection.  I always aim at true subjects, and I have to be content with shadows. The subject 
is separated from the Others, the true ones, by the wall of language… In other words, 
language is as much there to found us in the Other as to drastically prevent us from 
understanding him [244].   
 
The distinction we should make here is one between other individuals with whom the 
potential subject can identify and the big Other, from which the potential subject is 
separated by the wall of language. The first, other individuals, are fellow beings, so to 
                                                
4 The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II, The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of 
Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955. 
speak - people with whom the potential subject interacts and who, functioning as screens 
for a projection of the self, provide a reflection of selfhood.  The Other, which has 
representatives among fellow beings and social institutions, is nevertheless not an 
individual, but can rather be thought of as an originary cause-factor to which the potential 
subject perpetually returns and which acts as a guide for subjectivity within a social 
context. The point here is that we interact with other individuals through the symbolic 
medium of language, whereby the big Other, when we (unconsciously) identify with its 
desire, functions like signposts within the medium of language and the social. We might 
say that the big Other exists beyond the realm of language and the social (within the 
unconscious), though its desire is articulated within these realms. Lacan is interested in 
the way an individual emerges into and engages in the social. With the concept of the big 
Other, we can ask the following: How can we theorize a structural model for the 
psychological make-up of the individual, from which perceptions, desires, actions, and so 
forth will proceed? Such a psychological foundation finds its originary ‘raw material’ in 
the individual's early psycho-social experiences, which, to a great extent, are bound up in 
systems of representation and interpretation. That is, they are bound up in language. 
 
The first and longest installment of The New York Trilogy is the one most pointedly 
concerned with subjectivity as it relates to language. In City of Glass, the protagonist 
Daniel Quinn becomes accidentally mixed up in a case of missing persons. A stranger 
calls his house looking for a detective named Paul Auster. At first, Quinn is abrupt with 
the stranger, but later regrets this, and when the stranger calls again Quinn assumes the 
identity of Paul Auster, detective. Working under this assumed identity, he is hired to 
protect Peter Stillman junior from his father, who has recently been released from prison. 
When Stillman junior was but a few years old, his father locked him away in total 
isolation for nine years. Stillman senior, a professor of theology, believed that in the 
prelapsarian Garden of Eden there was a 'natural language': that is, a direct correlation 
between names and things. His hypothesis was that if an innocent child were to have no 
contact with the corrupting elements of the outer world, he would eventually begin to 
speak the 'true' names of things.  
In order to find out more about Stillman senior, Quinn goes to the library to do some 
research.  Having located a book Stillman once published, he comes across the following 
passage: “Adam’s one task in the Garden had been to invent language, to give each 
creature and thing its name. In that state of innocence, his tongue had gone straight to the 
quick of the world. His words had not been merely appended to the things he saw, they 
had revealed their essences, had literally brought them to life. A thing and its name were 
interchangeable” (43).  In this regard, we might say we are talking about language 
becoming material, as opposed to being a tool for representation. This is a pervasive 
motif throughout the book of Genesis: “God said ‘let there be light’, and there was 
light.”5 Though, as Quinn reads on, “[a]fter the fall… Names became detached from 
things; words devolved into a collection of arbitrary signs; language had been severed 
from God. The story of the Garden, therefore, not only records the fall of man, but the 
fall of language” (43). This difference between the idea of a material language and 
language as representation can be related back to Lacan's notion of the real vs. the 
symbolic. The real being the un-nameable, unknowable materiality of things, in 
Immanuel Kant's terminology, das Ding an sich (the thing in itself) or the noumenon. The 
symbolic, on the other hand, corresponds to Lacan's "wall of language," the location of 
representation in which meaning is produced. We might thus invert Stillman senior's 
claim by proposing that the story of the expulsion equates the rise of language as a 
system of representation with the rise of knowledge. What happens if we pursue this 
allegory? 
In the biblical tradition, we know that it is because of knowledge gained that Adam 
and Eve are expelled from the Garden and made mortal. We also know that, of the 
knowledges gained, or of the changes that resulted, one was knowledge of language as a 
system of representation. Thus, if we read the Fall as an allegory about language, we 
might propose that the knowledge gained translates into the capacity for abstract 
thinking. Before the expulsion, there was no difference between a thing and its name. 
Language was material, or, as Stillman senior notes, "[a] thing and its name were 
interchangeable." In this sense, ‘the word’ was distinct from language as we understand 
it: it was not an abstraction, but rather the thing itself. It is only after the fall that ‘the 
                                                
5 Genesis i. 3. 
word’ takes on its representative capacity, that it becomes something abstract and 
arbitrary. There is an event in the story of the Fall that illustrates this move from essential 
being (immortality; thing-ness), to abstraction (mortality; representation): 
 
The man and his wife heard the sound of the Lord God walking about in the garden at the 
time of the evening breeze, and they hid from him among the trees. The Lord God called to 
the man, ‘Where are you?’ He replied, ‘I heard the sound of you in the garden and I was 
afraid because I was naked, so I hid.’ God said, ‘Who told you you were naked? Have you 
eaten from the tree which I forbade you to eat from?’6  
 
We know, of course, that he has, and that it is because of this that he can have some 
concept of his nakedness, whereas before this newly acquired ‘knowledge’, he could not 
have. The acquisition of knowledge allows him to think in abstraction, or dialectically: 
the knowledge, ‘I am naked’ also includes the possibility of not being naked. Upon 
perceiving this split in man - a split by language, into binary thinking, into representation 
and abstraction - God recognizes that a vital change has taken place and that the 
irreversible has come to pass.  We encounter an additional allegory for the 'split' the 
acquisition of language necessarily brings with it when Quinn meets Stillman senior for 
the first time in Riverside Park. Quite appropriately, the split is allegorized through a 
reference to Humpty Dumpty, who also had a great fall. 
 
When discussing the possibility of a natural language, Stillman senior tells Quinn, 
“You see, the world is in fragments, sir. And my job is to put it back together again” (76). 
He continues, “our words no longer correspond to the world. When things were whole, 
we felt confident that our words could express them. But little by little these things have 
broken apart, shattered, collapsed into chaos. And yet our words remain the same”  (77). 
The “put it back together again,” is a clear reference to Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty, 
who surfaces a couple of pages later, when Stillman explains the significance of the 
initials H.D. to Quinn: “Humpty Dumpty. You know who I mean. The egg.” Quinn 
replies, “As in ‘Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall’?” Stillman goes on to explain that 
Humpty Dumpty was "a philosopher of language," and that the wall he sat on was, after a 
manner, Lacan's wall of language: "Humpty Dumpty: the purest embodiment of the 
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human condition… 'When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 
it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less. The question is, said Alice, 
whether you can make words mean so many different things. The question is, said 
Humpty Dumpty, which is to be master - that's all.'"7 As Bernd Herzogenrath suggests in 
his reading of Stillman's equation of the egg with the condition humana: "man himself is 
a split being because of language… Thus the originary egg is always already broken" 
(61). This brings us directly back to the idea that the nature of words, of language, is 
representative and arbitrary, and thus flexible and unreliable. This is precisely what vexes 
Stillman senior. Not surprisingly, it also occupies Quinn's thoughts. 
Quinn addresses the nature of the connection between things and language earlier in 
the story when he drives through Central Park, wondering “if these were the same trees 
that Peter Stillman saw when he walked out into the air and light. He wondered if Peter 
saw the same things he did, or whether the world was a different place for him. And if a 
tree was not a tree, he wondered what it really was” (36). The last sentence of this quote 
contains the suggestion that the things around us are different in their essence from what 
they are as we perceive them through language. This again is a nod in the direction of the 
Lacanian real and the Kantian noumenon: things have their thing-ness, an essence outside 
of representation, beyond the symbolic universe.  There is also the suggestion that the 
information one person’s sensory input relays to his or her mind and the way that 
information fits into that particular person's system of knowledge differs from the way it 
is processed in another person’s. With this we are not far off from the conundrum of the 
Cartesian circle: we can only be sure of something insofar as our mind tells us ‘it is true’, 
though by the same token, our mind depends on our undependable senses for the input of 
‘raw material’ that it uses to decide what is true.  
In postmodern (or poststructural) theory, we would say that this difference in 
perception is based in the way we each necessarily read signs differently, that the ever-
present gaps in the chain of signification produce an endless multitude of potential 
meanings. Thus, one person’s truth differs from another’s. Or to put it another way, one 
person’s tree differs from another’s. Of interest to language and subjectivity in The New 
York Trilogy is, then, not merely the idea that one exists within the realm of language as a 
                                                
7 Pp. 81. Quoting Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass.  
symbolic realm of representation, that one is 'split' by language (from the 'real', for 
example), but that each individual is situated differently within language; and, moreover, 
that our being situated within language hinges both on the symbolic nature of language 
but also on the interrelations between subjects within the symbolic as sharers in 
"symbolic fictions." The register of the symbolic is a matrix of language and 
representation, but it is also the location of the social in which symbolic fictions are 
negotiated. As Lacan notes: "the structures of society are symbolic" (Écrits, 132). A 
scene from The Locked Room can help to illustrate this point. 
 
Fort/Da 
In The Locked Room, the narrator, an author experiencing writer's block, is contacted by 
the wife of an old friend who has disappeared. This friend, also a writer, had informed his 
wife that if anything should happen to him, she should entrust his writing to the narrator, 
who would know what to do. As the story progresses, the narrator replaces his friend 
Fanshawe, publishing his work, moving into his home, and assuming the symbolic 
position of husband and father. The story documents the narrator's (psychological) 
relationship to his old friend Fanshawe, as well as the development of his relationship to 
Fanshawe's wife, Sophie, and son, Ben. 
At one point, the narrator recalls the moment Ben verbalizes his recognition of the 
narrator in the symbolic position of the father. While on a flight to New York to look for 
a new apartment, “Ben peed through his diapers onto my lap. When I showed him the 
large dark spot on my pants, he laughed, clapped his hands together, and then, looking 
straight into my eyes, called me Da for the first time” (241). The reference here, to show 
that the child recognizes him as  'father', can be read as a form of initiating interpellation, 
a call or 'hailing' of a potential subject into its symbolic capacity. The child recognizes 
the presence of the narrator in his significatory capacity as they are related to one another. 
This is wonderfully visualized by the pee spot: the child sees himself ‘on’ the narrator, so 
to speak. He is "Da" (there), as opposed to 'fort' (elsewhere). 
Lacan interprets Freud’s Fort/Da (gone/there) game as an illustration that a child has 
begun to think in symbolic terms. When it understands that its mother is fort for the first 
time, it has moved from the position in which the universe is one, in which everything is 
'me', to separation, to a universe of representation and language, where it can have a 
concept of its mother as she is gone. In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," Freud describes 
the game played by his grandson. It's worth quote at some length: 
 
This good little boy…had an occasional disturbing habit of taking any small objects he 
could get hold of and throwing them away from him into a corner, under the bed, and so on, 
so that hunting for his toys and picking them up was often quite a business. As he did this he 
gave vent to a loud, long-drawn-out 'o-o-o-o', accompanied by an expression of interest and 
satisfaction. His mother and the writer of the present account were agreed in thinking that this 
was not a mere interjection but represented the German word 'fort' ['gone']. I eventually 
realized that it was a game and that the only use he made of any of his toys was to play 'gone' 
with them. One day I made an observation which confirmed my view. The child had a 
wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it… What he did was to hold the reel by the 
string and very skillfully throw it over the edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared into 
it, at the same time uttering his expressive 'o-o-o-o'. He then pulled the reel out of the cot 
again by the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful 'da' ['there'].8 
 
In Freud's commentary, the object stands in as a representative for the mother. The child 
repeatedly throws the object away in an act through which it can heighten its pleasure in 
anticipation of the return of the mother. Via Lacan, we can see how this 'entry into the 
symbolic' erects a wall of language, immediately setting in motion the entirety of a 
symbolic universe composed of representation and symbolic fictions (the interrelations 
between potential subjects). With the emergence into representation, questions as to my 
place in the world begin to arise: What does the presence of the Mother, or inversely her 
absence, represent? How shall I interpret her sudden reappearance in response to my 
screams? How do I differentiate between the suffering of another screaming child and my 
own suffering? What does the Mother/Father want from me? What do I want? Such 
questions may be reductive, but they can offer some insight into how basic social 
structures are formed in relation to representation and interpretation - in relation to 
language. As such, they illustrate how the individual is continually confronted with the 
desire of the big Other per an encounter within the socio-symbolic, necessarily requiring 
interpretation. Or, to put it another way, social relations and symbolic fictions are 
regulated through systems of representation and, necessarily, interpretation. Critical for 
the individual's engagement in society is its ability to interpret various codes of 
                                                
8 The Freud Reader, 599. 
representation ('what does the Other want of me?'), allowing for the engagement in such 
symbolic fictions.  
Returning to The Locked Room, we can read the "Da" as indicating that the narrator is 
'there' and that he has come to fill the symbolic position of the father (Daddy); that a 
symbolic relationship (or 'fiction') has come into bloom between the child and himself. 
We should think of this in regard to what Dylan Evans, paraphrasing Lacan, says about 
entry into subjectivity and the parent/adult representing the big Other: "The moment after 
the subject has jubilantly assumed his image as his own, he turns his head round toward 
this adult, who represents the big Other, as if to call on him to ratify this image" (116). 
This is precisely what we witness in the recounting of the pee incident: "he laughed, 
clapped his hands together, and then, looking straight into my eyes, called me Da for the 
first time." We also witness something like this in City of Glass, but with a twist. 
When Quinn visits the residence of the 'real' Paul Auster, he meets Auster's son, who 
has found a yoyo out in the street, though he doesn't know how to use it. Quinn asks the 
son if he can try the yoyo. When he does, he is only able to make the yoyo go down, or 
'fort', but not return. Then, when Auster returns to the room, introducing Quinn to the 
boy, he says "Daniel, this is Daniel" (they are both named Daniel), in response to which 
the boy "burst out laughing and said, 'Everybody's Daniel!'" (102). Here, what we have is 
the inversion of what is portrayed in the pee incident and what is at stake in the Fort/Da 
game. Instead of the reel on the string disappearing and reappearing, acting as a trope for 
the symbolic fiction that separates 'me' from the rest of the world, the game does not 
function, leaving no distinction between me and the rest of the world ("'Everybody's 
Daniel!'"). This elegant inversion of the Fort/Da game in City of Glass and its reversion 
in The Locked Room act as more than a complex conceit in The New York Trilogy. They 
function metonymically for the overall states of subjectivity portrayed in each of the 
stories. In The Locked Room, the narrator ultimately moves into what we would consider 
proper subjectivity, identifying with the unconscious desire of the big Other and 
assuming a position within the socio-symbolic fictions of family and profession. 
Ultimately, the symbolic world 'functions' in The Locked Room. In City of Glass, on the 
other hand, Quinn appears to degenerates into imaginary mirror spaces, ending up, 
Bartleby-like, expiring alone in a small room that looks out onto an airshaft at the back of 
a building. His symbolic universe disintegrates. This juxtapositioning of functional 
symbolic fictions and imaginary mirror spaces, or let's say the linking of these two, is 
central to the overall structure of The New York Trilogy. Not incidentally, in a Lacanian 
theory of subjectivity, the symbolic register and subjectivity itself are inextricable 
interconnected with the register of the imaginary. 
 
According to Lacan, the register of the imaginary is a mirror-like realm in which 
fantasies of wholeness are fostered. If the symbolic is the realm of the social, then the 
imaginary is the realm of the ego, where the relation between the individual and others is 
reflexive and interchangeable. Here, an other is never another proper subject, but rather a 
phantasmatic reflection of the self, unmediated by socio-symbolic laws. We can think of 
the imaginary as the location of the double. From the very beginning of The New York 
Trilogy, we are made aware that we are reading stories about doppelgangers, specters, 
multiple identities compounded in one individual, and adherence to dyadic imaginary 
spaces. Within the first few pages, the narrator takes on several identities: Quinn, William 
Wilson, Paul Auster, Max Work. Quinn is framed as the 'actual' identity of the 
protagonist; William Wilson, his pen name; Paul Auster, a detective whose identity 
Quinn has assumed; Max Work, the protagonist of Quinn's books, who's also a detective, 
and beyond this there are still more mirrorings and doublings. There is also the 
intertextual signal toward the double in the reference to Poe's tale of haunting 
doppelgangers, "William Wilson." Poe's story likewise states in the beginning that 
William Wilson is the assumed pen-name of the narrator: "Let me call myself, for the 
present, William Wilson. The fair page now lying before me need not be sullied with my 
real appellation" (1). 
As Poe's tale progresses, we witness an unfolding of the spectral nature of a 
character's split identity, how he is haunted by his other self, which is finally exposed as 
a mirror-like phantasm. It is worth pointing out that Poe's tale is expressly concerned with 
a compromise in agency regulated or imposed by the mirror self (the imaginary): "Poor 
indemnity for natural rights of self-agency so perniciously, so insultingly denied!" (18). 
Here, we can see that Poe has 'read' both Freud and Lacan9: the tale suggests the 
'oppressive' limiting capacity the super-ego imposes as a controlling factor for the 
individual within society; but also that a dyadic adherence to imaginary space excludes 
the individual from the symbolic (ultimately resulting in psychosis). 
 
Doubles and the Imaginary in Ghosts 
The imaginary “relates specifically to the dual relation between the ego and the specular 
image” (Evans, 82). In Ghosts the relation to the specular image functions as a leitmotif: 
"in spying out at Black across the street, it is as though Blue were looking into a mirror, 
and instead of merely watching another, he finds that he is also watching himself" (144). 
Or, as Martin Klepper has suggested, "Blue's observation of Black increasingly becomes 
self-observation."10 In this story, the protagonist Blue, is hired by White to spy on Black, 
only to find out that Black and White are the same person, and perhaps that even he and 
Black are the same person. Blue moves into a hotel room across from Black's hotel room, 
where one window looks directly onto the other. The double-paned lens through which 
Blue observes Black, and which is at times doubled yet again through the use of 
binoculars, frames the reflexive act of looking, often into or through glass, that is so 
central to City of Glass and Ghosts. Glass, either in the form of a lens, a window or a 
mirror, often stands in as trope for how the individual is situated within language and the 
social. When it comes time for Blue to write the first report of his findings on Black, we 
are told:  
 
His method is to stick to outward facts, describing events as though each word tallied exactly 
with the thing described, and to question the matter no further. Words are transparent for him, 
great windows that stand between him and the world, and until now they have never impeded 
his view, have never even seemed to be there. Oh, there are moments when the glass gets a 
trifle smudged and Blue has to polish it in one spot or another, but once he finds the right 
word, everything clears up [146]. 
 
Expanding on this trope, we might propose that words function as windows when one is 
properly situated within the symbolic. Further, the symbolic function of words is 
                                                
9 It is, of course, the reverse that is true. Both Freud and Lacan were familiar with and drew on, Lacan in 
particular, the work of Poe. 
10 "die Beobachtung von Black wird immer mehr zur Selbstbeobachtung" (268). My translation. 
reflexive of symbolic fictions within the social. When one accepts the symbolic, 
representative nature of words and language, they function as a medium for 
communication and the basis for symbolic fictions. Likewise, subjectivity functions when 
one accepts certain symbolic mandates that will help to determine one's position within 
symbolic fictions. This, as I will illustrate, is what we see at work in The Locked Room. 
Problems arise precisely when one begins to dwell, as Stillman senior does, on the 
expectation that words should tally "exactly with the thing described." Stillman senior's 
pursuit of such expectations is thus paralleled by a collapse of symbolic fictions (his 
professional status, his family status, his more general social status as determined through 
his imprisonment) and of communication (embodied in Stillman junior). Throughout The 
New York Trilogy, reflections of the self through lenses, glass, and doubles are 
accompanied, then, by ontological crises of language and the social. For example, Blue 
"is able to invent a multitude of stories to fit the facts concerning Black," but "with the 
future Mrs Blue all is silence" (146). In other words, while Blue finds himself 
increasingly within the realm of the imaginary, where Black holds the position of an 
imaginary other, the specular image reflected back at the ego, his potential socio-
symbolic fictions (of family, for example) and his ability to create narratives about them 
diminish accordingly. 
There is an additional reference to this type of self-reflection given specific attention 
in Ghosts. It functions as a mise en abyme in which Blue recalls a story he read in a 
magazine once. While skiing in the French Alps, a young man finds himself near the spot 
where his father disappeared some twenty-five years earlier. The young man chances 
upon a body in the ice, only to find, horrifically, that it is his father looking back at him, 
dead and preserved: “The dead man was still young, even younger than his son was now, 
and there was something awesome about it, Blue felt, something so odd and terrible about 
being older than your own father, that he actually had to fight back tears as he read the 
article” (151). This passage is collocated within the diegetic trajectory alongside Blue’s 
‘epiphanies’ concerning how language obscures and at the height of his identification 
with his mirror projection, Black.11 What is it about this event that Blue is so moved by? 
                                                
11 “There are moments when he feels so completely in harmony with Black, so naturally at one with the 
other man, that to anticipate what black is going to do…he need merely look into himself” (156). 
There is something particularly disturbing about the son being older than the father, 
having 'survived' him in this rather unconventional manner. As we know, the father, in 
his symbolic capacity, can stand in at the location of the castrative Other. We are told that 
when the son first looks at the face in the ice, he has the impression he is looking at 
himself, at a mirror. Thus, what was once the location of the Other has suddenly shifted 
into mirror space, and the son finds himself ‘beyond the Other’, in a manner. It is not that 
the son has assumed the position that the father held (that the son is in an Other position), 
but rather that the father has covertly stolen into the position of the son (the other 
position), leaving vacant the location of the Other. This vacancy is precisely what speaks 
(or more precisely, what does not speak) to Blue, who likewise finds himself isolated 
from his 'Others' and from the world: “he wishes to God that his father could be 
there…telling him stories” and “[t]hat’s what happens when you have no one to talk to” 
(151). This brings us again to the notion of symbolic fictions, as mediated through 
narratives and language, being the way we exist in the world. Reduced to isolation and 
mirror reflections, with no one to talk to, with no narratives placing him in the position of 
the subject, Blue is cut off from the socio-symbolic and, like the son whose father has 
turned into an other, from any potential contact with the desire of the big Other. 
 
The Subject of the Big Other in The Locked Room 
If  Ghosts is constructed around a primarily imaginary model, then it is in the third story, 
appropriately titled The Locked Room, that brings us closer the an idea of the Lacanian 
big Other and the subject's relation to it. Where the ego inheres to the realm of the 
imaginary, the subject belongs to the realm of the symbolic. The subject is not merely the 
individual with a conscious sense of agency, but rather the subject of the unconscious (in 
Freud, das Es, not das Ich). It is the Lacanian big Other, the originary location of 
language, that mediates the unconscious subject's sense of propriety within the symbolic. 
The big Other is radical, inaccessible alterity and thus not accessible to the subject in the 
way little others are, but is at the same time essential to the subject. Although the big 
Other is in principle an unconscious agency, not an actual person, it can have 
representatives within the social, such as parents or representatives of the law, who give 
utterance to its desire. We find characteristics of the big Other in Fanshawe: 
 
Fanshawe stood apart from us, and yet he was the one who held us together… He was there 
for you, and yet at the same time he was inaccessible. You felt there was a secret core in him 
that could never be penetrated, a mysterious center of hiddenness. To imitate him was 
somehow to participate in that mystery, but it was also to understand that you could never 
really know him [210]. 
… 
I would get so close to Fanshawe, would admire him so intensely, would want so desperately 
to measure up to him – and then, suddenly, a moment would come when I realized that he 
was alien to me [212]. 
 
These two passages exemplify Fanshawe's Otherness, with his "secret core," his 
"mysterious center of hiddenness," and his ultimate alienness. Equally significant in this 
character is the impression he has left as an individual of indelible authority. He was 
always more capable than everyone else, always knew what the (morally) right thing to 
do was, and, for the narrator of the tale, always acted as a guiding social principle. These 
passages, with the condition of being concomitantly close to and at a distance from 
Fanshawe, also offer an explicit if simplified idea of the extimate quality of the big 
Other's desire: one imitates and integrates this 'external thing', though even in this 
integration, there always remains an inaccessible core, an ultimate alienness at an 
innermost locus. 
The following passages exemplify this condition of an 'internalized' abstraction that is 
at once gone in a real physical sense, but ever-present as an unconscious force: 
 
The fact that I did not once stop thinking about Fanshawe, that he was inside me day and 
night for all those months, was unknown to me at the time. And if you are not aware of 
having a thought, is it legitimate to say that you are thinking? I was haunted, perhaps, I was 
even possessed – but there were no signs of it, no clues to tell me what was happening [242]. 
… 
It seems to me now that Fanshawe was always there. He is the place where everything begins 
for me, and without him I would hardly know who I am… Whenever I think of my childhood 
now, I see Fanshawe. He was the one who was with me, the one who shared my thoughts, the 
one I saw whenever I looked up from myself [199]. 
 
Notable here is not only the way in which Fanshawe resembles a big Other, but also the 
way he functions like a mirror. As one quickly surmises in The New York Trilogy, clear 
distinctions between the register of the imaginary and that of the symbolic are often 
lacking. How can a character be both a representative from the imaginary realm of 
doubles and a representative of the big Other's desire, proper to the symbolic?  Lacan's 
simplified schema L might help to illuminate how this can function without being 
contradictory. 
 
The simplified schema L is intended to show how the Other functions by 'secretly' 
manifesting itself at the very core of the subject. It also reconciles the two distinct 
function-locations of the little other and the big Other:  
 
 
 S    a 
  
 
             a'   A 
 
 
In the upper left corner, we find the location of the subject (S; the narrator of The Locked 
Room's position), to the right of which is the ego as it is related to an other - that is, the 
sense of self resulting from identification with the specular image (a; the ego-self: Quinn 
and Blue); at the bottom left corner, we find the location of a little other (a'; other-
reflection: Stillman Jr., Black), across from which we find the location of the big Other 
(A; Fanshawe). "[T]he main point of the schema is to demonstrate that the symbolic 
relation (between the Other and the subject) is always blocked to a certain extent by the 
imaginary axis (between the ego and the specular image)" (Evans, 169). To put this 
another way, the subject 'has access to' the big Other through the imaginary medium of 
others. Thus, even as the ego-other is based on an external specular model that acts as a 
mirror - a little other - it is through this little other that the big Other 'speaks' its desire, 
albeit in an inverted or 'interrupted' manner. For example, the point of Blue's incursion 
into the 'inner sanctum' of Black is to provide Blue with a certain access to himself: 
  
Having penetrated Black’s room and stood there alone, having been, so to speak, in the 
sanctum of Black’s solitude, he cannot respond to the darkness of that moment except by 
replacing it with a solitude of his own. To enter Black, then, was the equivalent of entering 
himself, and once inside himself, he can no longer conceive of being anywhere else. But this 
is precisely where Black is, even though Blue does not know it [191]. 
 
It is here that Blue will encounter (albeit unaware) that which is himself and yet more 
than himself: some intimate and yet foreign force constituting an extimate kernel 'within' 
him. As a force guiding subjectivity, the big Other's desire consists as a condition of 
extimacy and decenterment. 
 
Extimacy and Decenterment: "a letter always arrives at its destination"12 
In a sudden "uncustomary act" of recording "certain facts" that "had nothing to do 
with the Stillman case," Quinn writes in his notebook, quoting Baudelaire: "It seems to 
me that I will always be happy in the place where I am not. Or, more bluntly: Wherever I 
am not is the place where I am myself” (p.109-10). This statement is not unlike the nature 
of the subject's fundamental displacement in relation to objet petit a (as object-cause, or 
that which sets desire in motion), and the function of lack. The Lacanian notion of lack is 
central to the function of desire. Dylan Evans points out that "when Lacan introduces the 
algebraic symbol for the barred Other…lack comes to designate the lack of a signifier in 
the Other… No matter how many signifiers one adds to the signifying chain, the chain is 
always incomplete; it always lacks the signifier that could complete it. This 'missing 
signifier'…is constitutive of the subject" (96). Lacan's method of employing semiotic 
models (the necessary gap in the chain of signification) to explain subjectivity become 
entirely evident in Evan's summary of lack. Thus, the way desire functions is closely 
bound to the way signification functions, with its gaps, perpetual deferral, and perpetual 
interpretation. As we can see here, desire forms itself around 'something missing'. This 
'something' - a lack - is precisely that which is also missing in the big Other: an essential 
mystery the subject perceives and integrates, taking it 'in' like an oyster does a grain of 
sand, around which its desire will take shape. Essential to the concept of desire, then, is 
that there is a double lack: a lack in the big Other which, when the subject identifies with 
the Other's desire, finally manifests itself as the lack in the subject determining its own 
                                                
12 Lacan, "Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter'" 
desire. In The Locked Room, we can identify just such a structure again in the relationship 
between the narrator and Fanshawe:    
 
I sensed that I was no longer alone, that I could never be alone in that place. Fanshawe was 
there, and no matter how hard I tried not to think about him, I couldn’t escape… After all 
these months of trying to find him, I felt as though I was the one who had been found… For if 
I could convince myself that I was looking for him, then it necessarily followed that he was 
somewhere else – somewhere beyond me, beyond the limits of my life. But I had been wrong. 
Fanshawe was exactly where I was, and he had been there since the beginning. From the 
moment his letter arrived, I had been struggling to imagine him, to see him as he might have 
been, but my mind always conjured a blank. At best, there was one impoverished image: the 
door of a locked room. That was the extent of it: Fanshawe alone in that room… This room, I 
now discovered, was located inside my skull.13 
 
Here Fanshawe is portrayed as a representative of this desire or psychological force that 
is both external and internal: Fanshawe is himself an impenetrable mystery "somewhere 
beyond me," and at the same time he "was exactly where I was…located inside my 
skull." The double lack is present here as well: the mystery that is Fanshawe, both 'here' 
and 'not here', and the image of his location within the narrator as an inaccessible, 
impenetrable locked room. 
We can bind the idea of the desire of the big Other, together with the notion of lack - 
this intimate but foreign element of the 'unknown' at the center of the subject - back to the 
concept of the symbolic mandate: like injunctions of the super-ego, the desire of the big 
Other guides the subject through society by giving form to what society wants from the 
subject. And what does Fanshawe, this intimate yet inaccessible psychological agency, 
require of the narrator? Precisely that he fulfill specific symbolic mandates, moving into a 
place of subjectivity in the social matrix of symbolic fictions: "Make her [Sophie] divorce 
me, and then marry her as soon as you can. I trust you to do that – and I give you my 
blessings. The child needs a father, and you’re the only one I can count on" (237). 
                                                
13 292-3. Within this passage that so closely resembles a Lacanian model of desire, one is also tempted by 
the line, "[f]rom the moment his letter arrived." As any good Lacanian knows, the "Seminar on 'The 
Purloined Letter'" ends with the line "what the "purloined letter"…means is that a letter always arrives at 
its destination." The head starts to real when one begins to consider the intertextual connections between 
this potential reference to Lacan's seminar on Poe's "Purloined Letter," Poe's own works that are less of a 
silent partner in The New York Trilogy, and Baudelaire, who also has a voice in The New York Trilogy and 
who translated Poe's "Purloined Letter" into French to boot. 
This mandate, when accepted, unfolds into a new universe for the subject, placing 
him at an initiatory point of reference: he becomes both husband and father, squarely 
placed within the socio-symbolic. With this initiation into the symbolic, we don't want to 
infer that the subject is suddenly at the center of a symbolic universe he was previously 
excluded from. Rather, the subject is always the decentered subject; or, to put it another 
way, the 'center' is always decentered:  
 
By belonging to Sophie, I began to feel as though I belonged to everyone else as well. My 
true place in the world, it turned out, was somewhere beyond myself, and if that place was 
inside me, it was also unlocatable. This was the tiny hole between self and not-self, and for 
the first time in my life I saw this nowhere as the exact centre of the world.14 
 
One can see how Quinn's quoting Baudelaire in City of Glass prefigures the narrator's 
move into subjectivity through his relation to Sophie in The Locked Room. The narrative 
trajectory that unifies the trilogy, then, takes shape through this very move from the 
isolated individual of the imaginary in the first story, toward the subject of socio-
symbolic fictions in the last.  
In The Art of Hunger, Auster refers to City of Glass as a love letter to his wife, Siri 
Hustvedt, "in the form of a novel. I tried to imagine what would have happened to me if I 
hadn't met her, and what I came up with was Quinn" (306). Bearing this in mind, what 
can it tell us about The Locked Room? Quinn's family disintegrates and he moves 
increasingly toward isolation, away from socio-symbolic structures. Answering a call that 
hails him into the location of husband and father, the narrator of The Locked Room does 
just the opposite.  Here, I would return to the claim that if we are to consider The New 
York Trilogy a work of detective fiction, the mystery each tale seeks to uncover is the 
mystery of the self in its social context. Lacan is particularly useful in reading such a 
mystery, as his theories of the subject find resonances in Auster's representations of self 
identity: subjectivity is contingent upon engagement in symbolic fictions that are rooted 
in language. Thus, if City of Glass is a portraiture of the individual without symbolic 
fictions (Auster without Hustvedt), The Locked Room is a portraiture of the subject within 
them. 
                                                
14 232, italics mine. 
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